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On Political Violence The topic of methodologies of social change is virtually a timeless matter of international interest. The means by which progress can best be achieved has been debated for years and will no doubt continue to be discussed and argued over as long as the imperfection of societies is a reality. On one side of this argument sits proponents of nonviolence, ranging from those proclaiming a strict adherence to others who at least on a minimal basis understand and practice the principles. In this category there are ample volumes of literary work dedicated to explaining the rationale, the justification on a moral and philosophical level, for engaging in nonviolent social struggle. However, on the other side of the fence, the opposing argument is against following a strict adherence to nonviolence. While few scholars, theorists, and outright revolutionaries openly declare their love and desire for armed struggle on any level, many do promote the right to self defense which can and often does include the use of political violence. On a sociological and psychological level, there is a wealth of resources attempting to understand the mindset of the group or individual who takes up arms and violence for reasons of pursuing justice. Additionally, on a purely tactical basis, from guerrilla warfare to massive armed insurrection involving full conventional militaries, there is also a substantial amount of literature. Yet, to the direct counter of the nonviolent theorist who maintains the means verses ends argument, there is little in the way of explanation from a rational standpoint of why one takes up arms. In this chapter I intend to discuss the strategy of political violence, particularly the tactical, moral, and philosophical justifications for the use of armed force in attempting to create a just world. It will most likely be helpful to first run through a couple of definitions. To begin, violence is often defined in varying terms. For this purpose, it is defined here as that which physically harms humans. Regardless of my personal beliefs, and the bulk of information supporting the notion that violence can also be psychological as well as against any life form (other animals, the natural environment), the above simplistic definition will suffice. Political violence therefore can be defined as actions taken for political purposes which harm humans. This explanation may well include violence committed by nation states against other nation states (such as the United States against Afghanistan, Iraq and many others in recent history), violence taken by nation states against international non-domestic populations (such as the United States military action against Al Qaida), action by nation states against their own population (Mexican government against Zapatistas, United States against Natives, African Americans, etc.), domestic groups against nation states (Weathermen against United States government, Angry Brigade against English government, etc.), domestic groups against one another (groups targeting industry and commerce, such as the Earth Liberation Front in contemporary times), all the way to the individual level with persons taking action against one another, populations, groups, and governments. Under this broad definition, political violence incorporates many varied opportunities and there are numerous examples of each type throughout recent history. For this particular paper, however, I would like to concentrate on the individual and group level, those who for one reason or many decide to use violence as a means for achieving justice and positive social change. The reasoning for the use of violence can be divided into at least two separate schools of thought. The first revolves around the idea that violence in some way is a natural reaction to various situations, especially those that are life threatening. For instance, when an oppressive government comes down upon a specific sector of a population, perhaps targeting them for annihilation (as in the case of Nazi Germany), that population often times will react in a violent nature, in a matter of self defense. While the overwhelming majority of Jews targeted by the Nazis did not react violently, a minimal proportion did throughout the implementation of the Nazi’s Final Solution. Another example can be found by looking at the Algerian Revolution. Moslem Algerians took up arms to fight the French only after it was evident that their very existence was at stake. The most extreme example illustrating this point occurs when an individual, targeted for assassination by a government, fights back with violence just prior to the execution. In these situations the decision to use violence as a means is not so much a well thought out, conscious, and deliberate one, as it is a matter of necessity, of urgency, and last resort. In his essay Let My People Go, printed in When All Else Fails: Christian Arguments on Violent Revolution, Duclos states: The violence of the poor is a violence that has been imposed on them, a violence that is necessary. He knows very well that the poor are the first and worst sufferers from violence, because the order of the powerful never hesitates to augment its violence when the “little ones” lift their heads. The violence of the poor is sacrificial. They spill their blood for a common liberation from injustice, for love of their fellows. It is a resistance of the spirit, an explosion of their dignity that has been left no other means for expressing itself. All ways of human expression have been closed to them, every dialogue refused, no attention has been paid to their painful and patient complaints. Nothing remains to them other than organized refusal, the deliberate will to die rather than continue living in slow motion (IDOC, 1970, p. 221). In these particular cases, as Duclos explains, when a disgruntled sector of the population is attacked and left no other recourse, the violent reaction that results often stems from a last ditch attempt to fight to the death to uphold the given principles. This particular category also encompasses those who engage in political violence purely as a means of self defense. In these instances there is often not the time, ability or luxury of debating what tactics are morally justifiable. Instead, the targeted individual, group, or population is in such a desperate struggle for survival they, without contemplation, use whatever means they have available. A by an means necessary approach, if you will. Examples of this can be seen within the few cases in Nazi occupied Europe when Jews on their way to the gas chambers would revolt and, in an effort to save their own lives, attack guards. The second area of thought on individual and small group political violence focuses on those who actually plan, strategize, and engage in violence out of a belief in its necessity for change. For this grouping the actuality of the committed act of violence is far moreso premeditated than spontaneous. Additionally, whereas the former group of discussion largely takes on a reactionary role of self defense and rarely engages in proactive violence, this latter category does indeed not only use the tactic as a matter of defense but also in offensive actions. Resources pertaining to the first school of thought are fairly abundant, with many theorists attempting to prove or disprove the notion that violence is a natural reaction, and others attempting to explain why in sociological or psychological terms the violent reaction occurs. Yet, in the second category, that of organized and premeditated political violence, written material is somewhat scarce. While both schools of thought should be of interest to anyone concerned with the subject of political violence, my primary investigative leaning is toward the latter grouping. Political violence has, as a matter of documented fact, been with humanity throughout its history. Davies, in his 1971 book, When Men Revolt and Why, argues that: Violence among citizens, of which revolution is the most extreme sort, probably goes as far back (as) in the history of government... Indeed it may be argued that violence of citizen against citizen, government against citizen, and citizen against government has always come before orderly political processes (p. 3). While this does not constitute a sound basis on its own for the continuance of political violence, there is an abundance of information to be gained by acknowledging and understanding its historic role. Some do however argue that humankind, with all its alleged intelligence and progress, should have found an alternative to violence by now, if there were a more viable alternative available. In his 1980 book, The Riddle of Violence, Kaunda states, “Man has suffered so greatly in wars throughout recorded time it must be assumed that if there were a more efficient way of achieving whatever end war serves, he would have found and applied it years ago” (p. 81). Of the available material discussing possible motives and factors provoking a violent pursuit of political goals, a common belief among theorists is that a state of frustration, deprivation, repression, and oppression is often present. In an essay entitled Social Change and Political Violence: Cross National Patterns contained within Anger, Violence and Politics: Theories and Research, the authors argue that “our theoretical assumption linking change to violence begins with the notion that political turmoil is the consequence of social discontent” (Feierabend et al, 1972, p. 108). They continue on to suggest that frustration can be defined as: the thwarting at or interference with the attainment of goals, aspirations, or expectations. On the basis of frustration-aggression theory, it is postulated that frustration induced by the social system creates the social strain and discontent that in turn are the indispensable preconditions of violence (p. 108). Some, such as Fanon and Duclos, go as far as to suggest that the act of violence in itself allows the practicer to regain his/her dignity and sense of worth. In one of his most renown works, The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon states, “at the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect” (1963, p. 94). Duclos adds “to die in refusal, in revolt, seems like the first gesture of the rebirth of oppressed man. For him it will be the assertion of his existence, of his consciousness of being human, a consciousness that refuses to let itself be alienated by other men” (1970, p. 221). The above stated hypotheses of causes of political violence are quite simplistic and one might say obvious. It seems like common knowledge that in the mind of someone committing political violence, they feel they have been neglected or wronged in some way by their opposition. In many cases this may be completely true. But why then do some choose to engage in political violence while others, perhaps under a similar set of circumstances, follow a less violent or even nonviolent path? The answer is not easily found. One realistic and grounded analysis differentiates between the various circumstances premeditating the outbreak of political violence. Like those Jews in the holocaust who rebelled on the way to their execution, there is a higher likelihood of violence being used when the applicant(s) perceives they are in a direct and immediate struggle for their life. In other situations, when those who have a feeling of being wronged are not (or do not feel as though they are) in a desperate and immediate battle for their lives, there often is more time for contemplation, for analyzing and discussing the proper strategies by which to proceed. In some of these cases, the decision might then be made to engage in less violent, or nonviolent tactics. Arguably, whether those in this particular situation would admit it or not, the decision to follow a path less violent may likely depend of the amount of personal safety, and even privilege, that is perceived at a given time. The next logical question that should be contemplated is why then do those who may not be in an immediate and desperate position of protecting themselves choose to resort to violence as a means of addressing their grievances? This question is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the notion of an immediate and desperate position of protecting one’s life is very relative. Any number of people may perceive the threats to one’s life in varying degrees of seriousness. A man involved in the drug trade, for instance, who learns there is a contract out on his life, knows full well that he is in a desperate and immediate situation. But often times the issue is much fuzzier. Members of the Earth Liberation Front have stated in their communiqués that protecting the environment is a matter of self defense. They feel that the threat to the natural world is so severe, desperate, and immediate that they engage in actions of sabotage to try and protect what they see as all life on the planet. Likewise, Dr. Ted Kazcinski, also referred to as the Unabomber, conducted a multi-year campaign of violence against what he saw as a technological world threatening all life. As the above examples demonstrate, there often times is a considerable discrepancy between what constitutes the notions of desperate and immediate. A second problem with the question of why one chooses to resort to violence is that in many instances, the parties involved do not feel as though they are choosing. Instead, more often than not, the applicators of political violence feel as though they have no choice, they were left no other option but to resort to some sort of armed struggle. Nelson Mandela who led the armed wing of the African National Congress during South Africa’s freedom fight stated: The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only to choices: submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our future and our freedom (Mandela, 1986, p. 122). Mandela called for the addition of violent tactics to be used in the liberation struggle in 1961 after “a long and anxious assessment of the South Africa situation” (Mandela, 1986, p. 166). He goes on to better describe the decision: This conclusion was not easily arrived at. It was only when all else had failed, when all channels of peaceful protest had been barred to us, that the decision was made to embark on violent forms of political struggle, and to form Umkhonto we Sizwe. We did so not because we desired such a course, but solely because the government had left us with no other choice (p. 166). This lack-of-choice justification is perhaps the most common reason given by individuals and groups who use political violence to further their own agendas. On a basic level of progression the argument makes sense – if tactics a, b, and c do not work on their own you either give up and submit or take things to the next level. For many who have first attempted more nonviolent and state sanctioned pursuits, they feel there is no other recourse left but to step up the pressure. It can be said that the Black Power movement in the United States came about, at least in part, due to the observation by many African Americans that nonviolent tactics on their own were not succeeding in advancing civil rights. In a 1965 interview that appeared in the Young Socialist, Malcolm X stated: I don’t favor violence. If we could bring about recognition and respect of our people by peaceful means, well and good. Everybody would like to reach his objectives peacefully. But I am also a realist... I believe we should protect ourselves by any means necessary when we are attacked by racists (X, 1965, p.17). A decade before Malcolm was to come into the heavy limelight, Robert Williams was arguing the need for blacks to arm themselves in self defense, to pick up where the law was lacking. In the late 1950s, Williams was the president of the Monroe, North Carolina branch of the NAACP. There he proclaimed: Rather than submit to violence, Negroes must be willing to defend themselves, their women, their children and their homes. Nowhere in the annals of history does the record show a people delivered from bondage by patience alone (Tyson, 1999, p. 215). Williams also practiced what he preached. He and a number of his followers used machine guns, dynamite, and Molotov cocktails to confront the Klu Klux Klan. The formation of the Young Lords Party in the 1960s also revealed a frustration that came as a result of attempting various nonviolent tactics. A U.S. based organization advocating for human rights, particularly for Puerto Ricans and Latinos, the Young Lords stated in their 13-point program: We are opposed to violence – the violence of hungry children, illiterate adults, diseased old people, and the violence of poverty and profit. We have asked, petitioned, gone to courts, demonstrated peacefully, and voted for politicians full of empty promises. But still we ain’t free. The time has come to defend the lives of our people against repression and for revolutionary war against the businessman, politician and police. When a government oppresses our people, we have the right to abolish it and create a new one. Again, the reoccurring theme is displayed here of those who argue they have attempted less severe and nonviolent tactics but they simply did not work. The above statement brings up two interesting points. The argument that nonviolent tactics did not work can simply be met by questioning the strategy of the implemented activities as well as the timeline on which they occurred. Criticisms from the nonviolence sector can easily be imagined that relate to the violent offender not giving nonviolent tactics enough time to work. But in the mind of the proponent of political violence, it is commonly argued that they feel that their own personal time limit set for less severe tactics expired. The question, how long is one supposed to wait to see if a particular tactic is going to be effective, is an important one but is also relative to each situation. For example, middle class citizens of the United States, of the leftist or liberal persuasion, arguably have far more time to debate tactics and experiment with strategies on general progressive “issues” than say a member of the PLO, who rightfully believes that Palestinians are in an immediate and desperate struggle for their lives and sovereignty against Israel. Thus, to reiterate, the perception of the urgency and severity of the threat to one’s life plays a definite role in deciding how able they are to argue for and take part in an adherence to nonviolent principles. The second point which the above statement highlights is why nonviolence did not work, at least for those who argue for the necessity of political violence. While attempting to refrain from the full debate between nonviolence and political violence, I do think it is important to understand the rationale of those advocating the latter. (This is especially a necessity as I have already covered the arguments by nonviolence proponents in earlier works). There is a belief held by many proponents of political violence that nonviolence can only work when the opposition has the capability of decency, compassion, and a necessary healthy and working conscience. Nonviolence philosophies, as preached by Gandhi and King, assume that an oppressive agent in any and every case has the ability to see the evils in his/her own actions and voluntarily change. Critics argue that, while nonviolence relies upon these key factors, not every opponent or agent of oppression has this capability. T. Melville, in his essay The Present State of the Church in Latin America, wrote: The revolution can only be peaceful when those who control the structures - the rich oligarchy - are willing to allow such a change to occur, recognizing the long-denied rights of the poor masses. To the degree that they oppose such a change, the masses will be forced to use ever more drastic measures, to take power into their own hands and thus effect change by themselves. It is the rich then, with those of allied interests, who have the real say as to whether the process will be peaceful or violent (IDOC, 1970, p. 217). Page 1/2 |